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ABSTRACT 
In this paper  subsidies  on  employment  increases  above  a 
benchmark  employment  level are proposed  as  a  policy to create additional 
employment.  For analysis  a  simple  general equilibrium model  is used with 
firms  maximising  the discounted value of  their intertemporal profits  and 
workers  maximising discounted utility.  Particular attention is given to 
the  financial  constraint on  the  subsidy programme  which plays  an  important 
role for the effectiveness  of  the  programme. 
The  analysis  shows  that marginal  employment  subsidies  can have 
a  significant effect on  employment  creation without worsening  the public 
sector deficit.  Over  time  also  investment  can be  expected  to  increase as 
a  response  to  employment  subsidies.  With  a  properly designed  subsidy 
programme  a  return to "full" employment  in industrial countries  seems 
feasible within a  few  years  even for  pessimistic empirical values  of  the 
real wage  elasticity of  labour  demand.  If economic  conditions  worsen 
further  in the near future  this  conclusion may  not hold anymore  in a 
strict sense while  an upswing of  the  business  cycle would  render return 
to "full" employment  easier. ii 
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1 •  INTRODUCTION 
Current unemployment  is at unacceptably high  levels  for both 
the  segment  of  the population concerned  and  policy-makers  in most  indus-
trialised countries.  The  causes  of  the rise in world-wide· unemployment 
are usually attributed to  the  severe  supply  shocks  in the  1970s  (the 
sharp  increase in oil and  other  raw  material prices),  the  associated 
redistribution of  income  from  countries with high propensities  to  spend 
to countries with  low  propensities  to  spend,  inadequate policy responses 
and  rigidities  in industrial economies  responsible  for  slow adjustment 
to a  different  environment1•  Rigidities  seem  to be more  severe for  the 
countries of  the  EEC  than for  Japan and  the  US  and  unemployment  in con-
sequence  has  risen more  sharply in the  EEC.  The  main rigidity can be 
seen in the  high  growth  of real wage  costs.  Instead of attenuating the 
supply shocks  through moderate wage  increases  the effects of  these  shocks 
have  been accentuated  in the  EEC  by  the wage  cost explosion of  the  1970s. 
An  approximate  empirical measure  for  these effects is provided by  the 
sharp  increase of  the  real wage  cost  gap  in EEC  countries which,  however, 
is an underestimate  since  firms  have  responded  by  reducing  employment 
.  d  .  .  2  to  1mprove  pro uct1v1ty 
In such  situations  economies  risk entering a  vicious circle. 
High  real wage  growth  leads  to higher unemployment  requiring higher 
unemployment  compensation payments  which  in turn increase public  sector 
deficits.  To  stem  the rise in those deficits several countries have 
increased direct or indirect taxation,  the  incidence of which  falls at 
least partly on  the corporate sector  (pay roll taxes  and  other  taxes) 
and  induces  a  further downward  adjustment of  investment  and  employment. 
1  See,  for  example,  OECD  (1982)  and  Sachs  (1979) 
2
oEGD  (1982)  and  Steinherr  (1982) -2-
The situation we  face  now  is  thus  to a  large extent due  to  the 
failure of  the evolution of wage  costs  to  correspond  to  changes  in  the  eco-
nomic  environment.  If this  environment were  to become  more  favourable  again 
employment  could  improve  automatically.  However,  the view is now  widespread 
that at least for  the short run  no  dramatic  improvement  of world business 
conditions  can be expected,  so  that measures  aimed  at reducing_  unemployment 
are urgently required. 
One  obvious  solution would  be  provided by real wage  reductions. 
However,short  run employment  elasticities for  EEC  countries in the  range 
from -0,4 to -0,8 suggest  that real wage  cost reductions  would  have  to be 
substantial  to  reduce  unemployment  to its "natural" leve13•  Feasibility 
of  this option is  therefore-severely limited and,  from  a  distributional 
point of view,  also quite unattractive. 
Some  specific proposals  have  been made  recently such  as  institu-
tional  reduction of work-time per  employed  or a  redistribution of  unemploy-
ment  through  increased part-time  employment  contracts4 •  While  the effi-
ciency  implications  of  such proposals  are uncertain they also have  the draw-
back of redistributing the  incidence  of unemployment  rather  than increasing 
employment  possibilities.  Furthermore,  while  these proposals  are  ad hoc 
for  the current slow growth period  they may  create  increased rigidities for 
a  potential  upswing  in the future,  and  they may  not  correspond  to workers 
preferences. 
Constraints  on demand  policy originating from already high 
government  budget deficits maintained  for  many  years,  combined  with doubts 
about  the  effectiveness of demand  stimulation even if it were  feasible, 
make  it unlikely that demand  policies will serve  to reduce  substantially 
unemployment.  Supporters  of  supply oriented policies  are  suggesting measures 
that  increase profitability in the private sector and ultimately lead  to  in-
creased demand  for  labour.  Such  measures  comnrise decreased profit taxes, 
accelerated depreciation allowances  or other  forms of investment  subsidies. 
Most  of  these measures  have  at best  a  limited  immediate  effect on employment 
or only an  indirect and  delayed effect.  If the  main  concern is to increase 
3see  OECD  (1982) 
4nreze  (1979) (2) 
-3-
employment  then it appears  sub-optimal  to  subsidize another factor of pro-
duction~  For  example,  reduced  taxes  on corporate profits affect  employ-
ment  only if higher profits  lead  to higher  investments.  Similarly,  direct 
investment  subsidies  may  not create any  additional net  employment,  if the 
substitution effect dominates6.  At  any  rate,since  investment plans  require 
time  for  realisation,  employments  effects if they exist will not be  felt 
•  "f"  1  .  h  h  7  s1gn1  1cant y  1n  t  e  s  ort run  . 
Some  economists  and  policy-makers  have  turned their attention to 
policies of direct subsidisation of  employment.  A general wage  cost subsi-
dy  such as,  for  example,  fiscalisation of  employers'  social security contri-
bution is debated  in some  EEC  countries8.  Such  a  policy would  tend  to 
decrease  the net real wage  costs  of  firms  and  the effects on labour demand 
would  therefore be  comparable  to  a  reduction in real wage  rates.  However, 
the  disadvantage  of  a  general  subsidy is  that  the  size of wage  cost reduc-
tion is necessarily severely restricted,  given current  government  budget 
constraints.  We  would  also argue  that general wage  subsidisation is not 
necessary.  A marginal  employment  subsidy  (MES)  has  a  much  larger effect 
on marginal  cost  than a  general  subsidy  costing  the  same  amount  and  the 
impact  on  employment  can therefore be  substantial,  as  is perhaps  most  easi-
ly seen for  an open  economy  with prices for  tradable  goods  largely deter-
mined  on world markets. 
5This  argument  is also in  line with  the principle of  optimal  subsidies 
due  to  Bhagwati  and  Ramaswani  (1963).  By  implication,  tariff protection, 
as  advocated  by  the  Cambridge  Economic  Policy Group,  would  also be  a  sub-
optimal measure  for  employment  stimulation. 
6Kesselman et al.  (1977)  estimate cost functions  for  US  manufacturing 
and  find  that capital and  white collar workers  are complements,  while 
blue collar workers  and  capital are substitutes.  Thus  investment  incen-
tives  favour  employment  of white collar workers  and  adversely affect 
employment  of blue collar workers. 
7The  empirical work  by  Nadiri  and  Rosen  (1969)  suggests  that  firms  adjust 
labour more  quickly  than capital. 
8General  wage  subsidies  on  a  macroeconomic  scale were  first  proposed  by 
Kaldor  (1936).  Borts  (1966)  also has shown  that with wage  rigidities 
a  wage  subsidy is superior to output or capital  subsidisation~ -4-
In the  short  run  an  MES  will have  the  effect of  stimulating 
hiring by  the  firm.  This  tends,  under  most  production conditions,  to  in-
crease  the marginal  product of capital and hence  investment  can also be 
expected  to  increase,  after some  delay.  Since  the  MES  lowers  the effective 
marginal  cost of  labour relative to capital,the capital  labour ratio is 
expected  to be  lower  under  a  subsidisation scheme  than without.  This  de-
cline of  the  capital-labour ratio is not,  however,  necessarily a  distortion. 
In fact,  it may  correct existing distortions which  result  from  capital 
b  "d"  .  h  .  1"  .  9  su  s1  1sat1on sc  emes  1n  app  1cat1on  . 
Since  hiring and  investing usually  involves  frictional  costs  in 
addition to rental costs,  one  would  expect  that  a  short-run subsidy pro-
gramme  would  be  less efficient than a  longer-run programme.  Adjustment  costs 
and  the duration of  the  programme  (or  the  likelihood of its maintenance)  are 
therefore essential elements  in the  analysis  of  such  a  programme. 
Administration of  MES  raises,  of  course,  some  practical difficul-
ties . ·While subsidies  could  be  made  specific for  certain skill groups  or 
employment  in particularly depressed areas,  we  shall  consider in this  paper 
an  MES  provided  for  the entire net  increase in employment,  taking as  bench-
mark  employment  at a  given  time  before announcement  of  the  subsidy programme. 
This  implies,  of  course,  that jobs  that would  have  been created without  the 
subsidy would  also receive it.  If net  employment  creation in all indus-
tries is  small  (or negative)  this  aspect can be neglected.  On  the  other 
hand,  if employment  creation is  important  in some  sectors  of  the  economy 
then it might  be  preferable  to  limit  the  subsidy  to  sectors where  employ-
ment  is declining.  At  any  rate the  subsidisation scheme  should be  kept 
administratively as  simple  and  neutral  as  possible in order not  to repli-
cate the inefficiency,  opaqueness  and  contradictions  of  existing investment 
subsidisation schemes. 
A future practical  issue is  the  time horizon of  the  subsidy 
programme.  If the  programme  is very  short-lived then neither  employment 
nor  investment will  even  temporarily be  much  stimulated when  there are 
adjustment  costs  in addition to rental  payments.  How  long-lived  the 
9For  an international comparison of capital subsidies  see Kopits  (1980). -5-
programme  ideally should  be  depends  essentially on the  time profile of  the 
general business  cycle.  If the  economic  environment  remained  stationary 
forever  (but  real wages  still remained  above  the  level  consistent with full 
employment  !)  then  the  employment  subsidy might best be  permanent.  Of 
course,  given the  skill-structure of  the unemployed  and  the skills demanded 
by  firms  it might  not  be possible with  any  general,  as  opposed  to skill 
specific,  policy to  create  jobs  for all.  The  target for  the  subsidy policy 
is  therefore  to  reduce  unemployment  to  a  level considered as  "normal". 
Layard  and  Nickell  (1980)  analyse  MES  within a  Keynesian  frame-
work.  Their main  conclusion is  that  the budget deficit cost per additional 
job is less  for  the  MES  than for  an  increase  in government  expenditure,  and 
that the balance of  payments  and  price level effects are always  more  favou-
rable.  Holmlund  (1978)  uses  an  inter-temporal maximisation model  for  the 
competitive firm and  alternatively for  a  dynamic  monopsony  in the  labour 
market.  He  shows  that a· ~pure hiring subsidy always  increases  the equili-
brium capital and  employment  levels. 
Both papers  fail  to  impose  a  financial  constraint on  the  subsi-
disation policy.  Layard  and  Nickell  follow  Keynesian procedures  allowing 
government  budget deficits  to  increase without  any  feedback  on agents' 
expectations  about  future  tax liabilities.  Holmlund  also neglects  any 
government  budget  constraint which  is justified by  his  focus  on  a  single 
firm.  The  subsidy he  analyses  is also  a  very  special  one  where  firms 
receive once  and  for all a  certain amount  per hiring. 
The  approach  taken  in this paper uses  an  intertemporal maximisa-
tion model  for  a  representative firm.  Subsidies  are paid for  each  addi-
tional hiring forever,  that is  each period,  but there is an  increasing pro-
bability over  time  that  the  programme  will be discontinued.  Furthermore, 
we  introduce  finance  constraints  on  the  MES  and  the  representative  firm 
takes  into account its share of future  tax liabilities.  This  essentially 
makes  it more  difficult for  the  subsidy  to stimulate employment  than in 
a  partial equilibrium framework  or  in the  Keynesian framework  without  a 
budget constraint. -6-
Section  2  serves  to  lay  foundations  and presents  the model. 
Section 3  contains  an analysis  of  the  MES  under  the constraint that the 
initial government  budget deficit cannot be  exceeded.  Section 4  repeats 
the  analysis under  a  more  general  constraint where  government  finances  defi-
cits on external capital markets  and where  the  cost of borrowing is covered 
through  taxes  on  firms.  The  analysis  of  Sections  3  and  4  is focused  on  the 
open sector of  the  economy  which  represents  more  than half of  total employ-
ment  in EEC  economies  and  on which fell  the brunt of  the decline in employ-
ment.  To  complete  the investigation and  to verify that  employment  creation 
is not  achieved  simply  through exporting unemployment.  Section 5  analyses  a 
closed economy.  Section 6  summarises  the main  conclusions of the paper.  This 
paper is mainly  theoretical  and  notes  the practical implications only  in 
passing.  A second  paper  (in preparation)  discusses  in greater detail  the 
practical aspects  of policy implementation and  surveys  the available  empi-
rical evidence. --7  -
2.  THE  FRAMEl-IORK 
We  first present  the basic idea motivating this paper  in a  sta-
tic framework  and  then describe  the model  used  for  the  analysis  to  follow. 
2.1  Marginal  employment  subsidies  in a  static labour market 
To  facilitate  the  analysis of MES  we  compare  such  subsidies 
with  a  reduction in real wages  in the  simplest possible framework,the 
standard static text-book representation of  the  labour market.  We  there-
fore  postulate a  macroeconomic  demand  function for  labour which  is  assumed 
to be  a  non-negative  function of  the real wage  rate.  The  capital stock, 
tax structure and  monetary  conditions are assumed  constant.  In line with 
actual  practice in EEC  countries  the  full  employment  target  (L)  is consi-
dered  to be  exogenously  given as  the  sum  of current  employment  (N  )  plus 
0 
unemployment  minus  a  correction for  "normal" unemployment.  Furthermore 
the  real wage  rate  (w/p)  is taken as  being fixed  by  labour unions.  These 
are stark assumptions  but  they  capture  the essential features  of  the  pro-
blem.  A recapitulation is contained  in Figure  I. 
Figure  1 
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At  the initial employment  level N  gross  domestic  product  (GDP) 
0 
is equal  to  the  surface  (a+ b  +  c),with  (b  +c)  representing  labour in-
come  and  (a)  non-labour  income.  A real wage  reduction to  (w/p)1 would 
create full  employment  and  a  higher  GDP.  However,  labour  income,  now 
equal  to  (c +e), would  fall in absolute  terms  with  an inelastic labour 
demand  curve and  non-labour  income  would  very strongly increase absolutely 
and  as  a  proportion of  GDP. -8-
Consider now  an  MES  for  employment  above  N
0
,  keeping real wages 
constant.  For  labour  demand  to  rise to  full  employment  the unit subsidy 
{- w}  - {-w}  1  d  ·  h  d  ·  must  equal  Emp  oyment  an  GDP  are as  w1t  a  wage  re uct1on, 
p  0  p  1 
but  labour now  receives  (b  +  c  +  d  +  e  +  f)  and  non-labour  income  is  equal 
to  (a+ d).  The  area  (d +f) represents  the  em~loyment subsidy.  Since 
GDP  is only  (a  +  b  +  c  +  e)  gross  factor  incomes  exceeds  net factor  in-
comes  by  (d +f), the  amount  of  taxes  required  to  finance  the  subsidy 
programme.  But it is  to  be  noted  that  also in initial equilibrium 
gross  incomes  ar~ taxed  to finance compensation for  the unemployed.  Suppose 
therefore  that unemployment  compensation is  financed with  taxes  levied  on 
non-labour  income  and,  furthermore,  that unemployment  compensation ini-
tially does not fall short of  the  area (d  + f).  Then  two  conclusions  follow 
(i)  the  employment  subsidy is feasible  even under  the constraint that  the 
absolute  tax burden  on non-labour  income  should not  increase  (the  tax 
relative  to non-labour  income  would  of  course decline)  ;  (ii)  the  share of 
non-labour  income  in GDP  would  rise since a/(b  +  c)  is smaller  than d/e. 
Thus,  with  a  real wage  cut  labour  income  falls  and  non-labour 
income  rises  substantially whereas  with an  MES  labour  income  rises  in pro-
portion to  the  employment  increase while only  the  share  of  labour  income 
falls.  If  the  tax  incidence fell  on  labour  income  rather  than  on non-
labour  income  the  analysis  and  the  results would  remain unchanged.  Diffe-
rences  would  only arise if the  tax  incidence  of unemployment  payments  were 
opposite  to  the  one  of  employment  subsidies. 
Essentially  two  factors  differentiate  a  wage-cut  policy  from  MES. 
First, with  a  wage-cut policy non-labour  income  not  only  gains  (b  +  d) 
but also  saves  taxes  which  finance  the unemployed  in the initial equili-
brium.  By  contrast,  under  the  subsidy  scheme  non-labour  income  would  still 
be  taxed  in the  new  equilibrium to  finance  subsidies.  Second,  MES  extracts 
the  intra-marginal  revenue  (b)  from  non-labour  income.  That is,  labour 
and  government  together act like a  monopolist  "riding down"  the demand 
curve  which  is of  course  the optimal  strategy for  any monopolist when 
discrimination is feasible. 
The  questions  we  wish  to analyse  in this  paper,  for  a  given MES, 
is  as  follows. -9-
(i)  Is  employment  necessarily rising  ? 
(ii)  Can  full  employment  be  reached under different constraints  on  subsidy 
payments  ? 
(iii)  What  are  the characteristics of  the  time path  from  initial employ-
ment  to  the  new  equilibrium employment  ? 
(iv)  How  are  the results affected when  the  duration of  the  subsidy pro-
gramme  is either finite or stochastic  ?  How  do  risk-attitudes of 
employers  affect  the results  ? 
(v)  Is  there  an optimal  subsidy programme  ? 
(vi)  Do  the  conclusions  depend  on whether  the  economy  is open or closed 
or,  in other terms,  do  the  conclusions  depend  on  the degree of 
openess  of  the  economy  ? 
Analysis  of  these questions  requires  a  dynamic  general equili-
brium framework.  To  keep  the analysis  manageable  we  specify an extremely 
simplified model  which  captures  however  the  features  of  interest to us. 
2.2  The  Model 
We  consider an economy  with n  identical  firms.  In the  open 
economy  firms  are price-takers  in their output market with  the price 
given by  the world  market.  They  are also price-takers  in factor markets, 
the price of  the capital  good  being m and  the wage  cost being w.  The 
latter can be  viewed  as  being  imposed  by  labour unions.  Firms  have  a 
production function Q(K,  N)  with non-increasing returns  to  scale,  where  K 
is  the capital stock and  N the  employment  level of  the  firm at time t. 
We  also assume  that  investment  (I)  and  hiring  (A)  give rise to adjustment 
costs  of  the  following  form10 
(I) 
The  firm  is assumed  to maximise  the present value of its profits stream 
net of  taxes  (T)  and  subsidies  (S).  We  consider an  MES  of  the  form: 
-<-2)  S  = c;(N  - N  ) 
0_ 
(IO)The  assumption of  convex adjustment costs  in A and  I  is standard in the 
literature.  See  for  example  Gould  (1968). -10-
The  subsidisation scheme  (2)  implies  that  any net hiring above 
initial employment  N  is subsidised at the  rate s  per worker  as  long as 
0 
the policy is in affect.  Holmlund  analyses  an  MES  of  the  form  S  =  s(A - kN) 
which  amounts  to subsidising new  employment  only at the moment  of hiring. 
For  k  >  0  only hiring above  the  threshold  level  kN  is subsidised.  We  shall 
show  that for  k  =  0  the  two  schemes  for  MES  are  technically equivalent, 
but not  in their incentive effects. 
In general,  a  firm  cannot  be certain that  the  subsidy will be 
provided  forever.  We  postulate that at t=O there  is  a  probability path 
cr(t)  that  the  subsidy will be maintained at any  moment  in time  t  > 0. 
We  assume  that this probability declines  over  time  as  follows  : 
(3)  cr(t) 
The  firm  seeks hiring policy A.and  investment  I  so  as  to maximise  the 
discounted  stream of  future profits  (nt,  t  ~ 0) 
(4)  v 
where 
(5)  TI  =  pQ(K,  N)  - wN  - C(A,  I)  - mi  +  OS, 
subject  to  the  constraints 
(6)  N  A- qN 
(7)  K  =  I  - oK, 
and  a  constraint on  the  public sector deficit to be  specified in Sections 
2  and  3.  In  (4)  r  is  the  exogenous  discount rate and  y  a  measure  of risk 
aversion  (o  <  y  ~  1)  ;  in  (6)  and  (7)  q  is the quit rate and  o the rate 
of capital depreciation.  Definition  (4)  is  an  approximation of  the dis-
counted utility from  the  expected profit stream.  In a  deterministic 
context  the  maximisation problem can be  given the  following reinterpreta-
tion  :  cr(t)s  represents  a  pre-announced path for  the  subsidy rate and 
firms  maximise  the  concave utility function  nY. (3) 
-11  -
3.  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDIES  CONSTRAINED  BY  INITIAL  UNEMPLOYMENT  COMPENSATION 
EXPENDITURES 
We  consider as  starting point for our analysis  a  situation close 
to one  which  can be  observed in many  economies  :  high  levels of unemploy-
ment  where  the  unemployed  receive unemployment  benefits expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  current wages  for  the  employed.  Given also  the state of  pu-
blic finance  in those  economies  any  new  policy ideally ought  to respect  the 
constraint of not  increasing further  the  government's  budget deficit.  In 
this  section we  impose  therefore this constraint in the  following  form 
employment  subsidies at any  point  in time are not  allowed  to  exceed  the 
savings  in disbursements  of  unemployment  benefits.  With  n  identical firms 
this constraint can be written  : 
(8)  ns(N - N )  + wa(L  - nN)  <  wa(L  - nN  )  o  o-
or, 
(8')  s  <_wa, 
where  nN  is  the  initial employment  level  for  the  economy,  L  is  the  exoge-
o 
nously  given full  employment  level,  N is current  employment,  w is  the  exo-
genous  nominal  wage  rate,  and  a  is  the proportion of wages  provided  as 
unemployment  benefits.  The  LHS  of  (8)  is the  sum  of  subsidies  and  unemploy-
ment  benefits at  time  t  which must  not  exceed initial unemployment  benefits 
on  the  RHS.  This  constraint collapses  to  (8')  which  says  simply  that the 
subsidy per worker must  not  exceed  the unemployment  benefit per unemployed. 
Constraint  (8') will actually not affect the  optimisation of  the  firm but 
only  the  intervention of  the  policymaker. 
The  objective function  in  (4)  being concave  in the state and 
control variables  we  only are  concerned with  the necessary conditions  for 
an optimal  solution.  Application of  standard optimal control  theory 
h  .  11  •  ld  h  d.  .  tee n1ques  y1e  s  t  e  necessary  con 1t1ons  : 
(9)  A.  = c  7TY-1y 
1  A 
11  - See,  for  example,  Arrow  and  Kurz  (1970). -I2-
(IO) 
where  AI  is  the present value  of  the  shadow-price  for  labour,  and  A2  the 
present value of  the  shadow-price  for capital.  AI  and  A2  are determined 
by  the differential equations 
.  y-I  (II)  AI  -(r +  q)AI  (- pQ  +  w - crs)n  y  N 
.  y-I  (12)  A2  -(r +  c)A  = -pQ  TI  y  2  K 
From  (9)  to  (12)  one  obtains  : 
(13) 
(14)  y-1  oo  -(r +  q)  (v - t)  y-1  TI  (t)  (C1  +  m)  = ft e  (qQK)TI(v)  dv. 
Equation  (13)  says  simply  that at each  instant  labour  is hired up  to  the 
point where  the  instantaneous marginal  adjustment  cost,  converted  to 
utility losses  (ny-l{t)CA)  just balances  the  discounted utility gains  over 
all future  time arising from  the  additional unit of  employment.  Equation 
(14)  has  a  similar interpretation for  investment. 
3.1  Equilibrium solution 
The  equilibrium solution is characterised by12 
(15) 
(16)  (r  +  8)  (C1 
+  m)  . 
12rf an  MES  of  the  form  S  =  s(A - kN)  is used  then condition  (15)  becomes 
(15')  pQN  =  (r +  q)  CA  +  w +  (k - r  - q)s  and  (16)  remains  unchanged. 
For  s  to have  a  positive effect on  employment  the  condition k  <  r  +  q 
must  be  met.  If k  = 0  then  (15)  and  (15')  are  identical since  a  subsidy 
of  one  dollar paid once  and  for all at the  time  of hiring is equal  to  a 
continuous  subsidy  stream of  (r +  q)  dollars.  However,  when  the  once  and 
for all subsidy is received  there  is no  incentive  to maintain employment 
when  k  = 0.  On  the other hand,  for  k  >  0 (15')  implies  a  lower effect of 
subsidies  on  employment  than  (15). -I3-
These  conditions  show  that risk attitudes  do  not affect the equilibrium 
solution,  only  the  dynamic  paths.  From  (IS)  we  see  that  the  subsidy 
lowers  the  effective marginal wage  cost  and  thus  an  increase in the  expec-
ted  subsidy has  the  same  effect as  a  decrease  in the wage  rate.  Differen-
tiating totally  (IS)  and  (I6)  yields 
(I8)  pQKNdN  +  pQKKdK  =  (r +  o)  c11  odK. 
Using  CAA  =  a
0  and  c11  =  ai  we  obtain 
(I7') 
(I 8') 
Hence 
( I9) 
(20) 
where 
dN  I 
d(w- as) =X {pQKK- (r +  o)al}  <  0 
0 
dK  I  (  Q  )  <  O  d(w  - a  s)  = X  -p  NK 
0 
2  2 
~ ={pQKK- (r +  d)aio}{pQNN- (r +  q)aoq}  - P  QNK  >  0 
I3  (assumed)  • 
Thus  we  see  from  (19)  and  (20)  that an increase in employment  subsidies 
increases  both equilibrium employment  and  the  equilibrium capital stock. 
A question of  considerable interest is whether  any feasible 
subsidy will steer the  economy  to full  employment.  We  consider the 
l3  2 
~KKQNN  >  QNK  is a  standard condition,  which  always  holds  for  a  Cobb-
Douglas  production function with non-increasing returns  to scale. 
Adjustment  costs  only strengthen .this  condition. -14-
least favorable  case where  the  capital stock  remains  constant  :  if full 
employment  can be  reached with  this  condition then it is also  reachable 
and  even much  more  easily when  capital adjusts.  With  K fixed  (19)  can be 
rewritten as 
(19')  dN 
d(w  - cr  s) 
0 
Defining n as  the elasticity of  employment  with respect  to net wages  we 
obtain 
(19") 
Hence 
(20) 
n 
dN 
N 
dN 
d(w  - cr  s) 
0 
(w  - cr  s) 
0 
N 
d(w  - cr  s) 
n ___  ___;;_o_ 
w - cr  s 
>  0  for  d(w  - cros)  <  o. 
0 
w - cr  s 
0 
N  < o. 
From  constraint  (8)  we  need  cr  s  <  w a.  With  wages  fixed,  d(w  - cr  s) 
0  0 
=  - cr  ds  and  if in the  initial equilibrium s  =  0  then  cr  ds  <  w a.  Hence 
0  0 
(20') 
dN 
N 
cr 
0 
- n - ds < - na'  or  w  -
dN  <  _ n . 
a  N  -
In  European  economies  a  ranges  typically between 0,5 - 0,8  for 
the  short-run  (one year),  while  the  unemployment  rate is  around  0,10. 
With  a  target unemployment  rate of 0,05  the most  difficult policy case 
is  therefore  for  a  =  0,5 and  a  desired increase  in employment  by  0,05. 
To  reach  this  target,  condition  (20')  requires  that- n  ~ 0,1.  If in 
addition,  the  subsidy were  only  provided  to  the  open  sector of  the  econo-
my  then  the share  of  the latter in total  employment  becomes  important. 
Taking  0,5 as  a  lower  bound  for  this  share  the  labour  demand  elasticity 
would  have  to  exceed  0,2  to  generate  an  increase of  employment  in the  open 
sector by  10  percent,  equal  to  a  5  percent  increase of  economy-wide 
employment.  Except  for  the very  short-run  (less  than a  year)  - n  =  0,2 
can  safely be  considered  as  a  lower  bound  on  empirical  labour  demand 
ela-s-ti-c-it:-i-e-s- se- t-hat  -emp-loyment  subs-i-dies -should  lead  the  ec-orromy  to-
full  employment  over  the  short  to medium  run. -15-
3.2  Dynamics 
The  eigenvalues  for  the  subsystem  (N,  A)  are  (see  equation  (4) 
in the  Technical  Appendix) 
(21) 
wh,ere 
r  1 
P1,P2=-+-!J.  2  - 2 
tJ.2 
=  r 2  +  4  {q(r +  q)a 
0  IQ  1}/{  (1  _  y)a  2q2N2/TI}  +  P  NN  ao  +  o 
and with all quantities  evaluated at equilibrium. 
Clearly,  p1  >  0  and  p2  <  0  so  that  the  equilibrium displays 
locally saddle-point behaviour with  the  stable arms  of  the  saddle  forming 
the  unique  optimal path.  The  absolute value of  the negative root p2  is 
the  speed with which  the optimal  path locally approaches  equilibrium. 
It is now  of  interest to determine  how  parametric  changes,  in 
particular of y,  a,  s  affect the  speed  of  adjustment.  The  derivatives  of 
~ with respect  to y,  a  and  s  are  given by  (5)  in the  Technical  Appendix. 
They  have  the  following  signs 
(22)  > o,  < 0,  <  0  . 
Increased risk aversion as  measured  by  a  decline of  y  leads  to a 
lower  speed of adjustment.  Thus,  whereas  final  equilibrium is independent 
of  the degree of risk aversion dynamic  adjustment  does  depend  on risk 
attitudes.  The  analysis  confirms  the  intuition that risk aversion  creates 
a  lower  employment  response  to wage  subsidies  along  the  adjustment paths. 
While  the equilibrium analysis has  shown  that an  increase in as 
generates  a  higher  equilibrium employment  level, such  an  increase  tends 
to  reduce  the  speed  of  adjustment  to  equilibrium.  The  reason for  this 
trade-off pattern will become  clearer in the discussion of  the  impact 
effects  to which  we  now  turn. 
The  optimal  time  paths  for  N and  A obtained by  linearisation 
around  the equilibrium  (N,  A)  are  given by  equations  (8)  and  (9)  in the -I6-
Technical  Appendix  and  are  reproduced  as 
(23)  N(t) 
(24)  A(t) 
We  first consider  a  change  in y  and  its effect on  the  time path. 
As  y  increases  p2  increases  in absolute value.  This  implies  that  for  any 
t,  employment  N(t)  is  increased.  The  effect on  A is more  complex  :  for 
t  = O,A  jumps  to  a  higher value  A(O)  and  moves  at a  higher  speed.  Given 
that in final  equilibrium A is  independent  of y  this  implies  that even-
tually the  time  path under  less  risk aversion is closer to equilibrium 
for  any value  t  >  t  .  These  facts  are depicted  in Figures  2a  and  2b  for 
the  case  N  < N  which  concerns  us. 
0 
From  (23)  and  (24)  it can be  seen  that  a  change  in y  leaves  N(O) 
unaffected but A(O)  shifts in proportion to y,  that is,  lower  risk aversion 
implies  a  stronger initial hiring response.  However,  since final equili-
brium is  independent  of  y  the hiring response after some  time  is bound  to 
fall  below  the one  obtained with higher risk aversion. 
We  now  turn  to  analysing  the effect of  changes  in crs  on  the 
dynamic  path.  These  effects are most  clearly seen by viewing  the  dynamic 
optimal  path in the  (N,  A)  phase-plane.  This  path is labelled PP  in Figure 
3a,passes  through  the point  (N,  A)  lying on  the  line N = 0  and  has  slope 
(see  equation (II) of  the  Technical Appendix)  : 
(25) 
dN  _ 
dA  - _q_+_p_
2 
The  effect of an  increase  in os  is to move  N  and  A upward  along  the N  = 0 
curve.  Thus  the  optimal  path  PP  moves  to  the right as  depicted  in Figure 
3b. 
It is clear from  Figure 3bthat the  stronger  the  increase in crs 
the  larger will be  the  jump  in hiring at time  0.  It is easy  to verify 
that  a  decrease  in o  decreases  p2  in absolute value and  hence  increases 
the  slope of  the adjustment  path  p* p*.  Therefore  the initial jump  in 
hiring will be  smaller with higher risk aversion. employment 
N 
N 
0 
hiring 
-
A 
-17-
N(t  y  <  1) 
y  1  ) 
time 
Figure  2(a) 
A(t,  y  =  1) 
y  <  1) 
t 
time 
Figure  2(b) -18-
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4.  FISCAL  DEFICITS  FINANCED  ON  EXTERNAL  CAPITAL  MARKETS 
In Section  3  an arbitrary,  albeit empirically highly relevant 
constraint was  imposed  on  the  availability of  funds  for  employment  subsi-
dies.  In this  section a  more  general  constraint is  introduced.  More 
precisely,  the  government  is assumed  to  be able  to  finance  any  fiscal 
deficit by  borrowing  on  international capital markets  at a  given interest 
rate r.  Furthermore it is assumed  that  loans  have  to be  repaid at the rate 
f.  The  evolution of  the  foreign debt  (F)  can  then be written  : 
(26)  F = ncrs(N- N )  +  wa(L- nN)  - fF. 
0 
The  cost of foreign borrowing,  consisting of  interest payment  and 
repayment  of  the principal is  supposed  to be  borne  by  firms.  This  assump-
tion is made  in order not  to create a  fiscal deficit whose  financing occurs 
outside of  the model.  Of  course,  one  could also  envisage  the  case where 
consumers  or workers  are  taxed  in order to  cover  the cost of  foreigr1 
borrowing but this raises  the question whether unions  base their wage 
claims  on  gross  wages  or  on wages  after taxes.  In the latter case  a  tax 
on wages  would  simply be  rolled over  to a  higher real wage  rate.  In the 
former  case  one  could,  of  course,  envisage that unit wage  costs  remain 
constant but  that real  income  of wage  earners declines  as  a  consequence 
of  the  tax. 
We  specify  therefore  several hypotheses  concerning financing  of 
the  foreign debt.  The  first hypothesis  is  that the  tax is  imposed  on 
firms  where  the  tax on  the  representative  firm  equals  : 
(27)  T = (r +  f)F/n  • 
Equations  (26)  and  (27)  imply  that  the  firm  takes  into account 
the fact  that the other n  - I  firms  behave  in exactly  the  same  way  as 
itself.  The  second  hypothesis  corresponds  to  the  case where  firms  behave 
only according  to price  information,  i.e., as  a  competitive firm.  Then 
(26)  has  to  be  rewritten  : 
(26') 
0 
F  L  crs(N  - N )  + wa(-- N)  - fF  •  o  n -20-
(26')  has  the  following  interpretation.  The  firm calculates 
its share for  the evolution of  the  foreign debt.  When  it considers  a 
change  in its employment  level it only  takes  into account  the effect of 
its own  change  in employment  on  foreign debt  and  not  the fact  that  (n- I) 
other firms  may  do  exactly  the  same. 
The  third hypothesis  embodies  the possibility that taxes  fall 
on  other agents  than  the  firm.  For  example,  they  are  imposed  on  wage 
earnings  and  for definiteness  and  simplicity we  assume,  in addition,that 
wages  do  not  change  in consequence. 
lole  now  analyse  these  three  cases  in turn. 
4.1  Analysis  of  three  cases  of  tax  incidence 
Case  1 
(28) 
Here profits are  redefined as 
TI  = pQ(K,  N)  - wN  - C(A,  I)  - mi  + as(N- N )  - T  , 
0 
where  T is defined  in  (27) 
(6) 
(7) 
(26) 
. 
N  A  - qN 
K = I  - oK 
. 
F = nas(N - N )  +  wa(L  - nN)  - fF 
0 
yields  the first-order conditions 
(29)  Y -1  Al  = yn  CA 
(30) 
and  the differential equations -2I-
(3I)  y-I  }  {yrr  rrN + A 2n(as  - wa) 
(32)  ~ 2 - (r +  f)A2 = yrry-I(r  +  f)/n 
(33) 
Equilibrium values  are determined by 
(34)  pQN  = (r +  q)CA  +  (I  - a)w 
(35)  pQK  = (r  +  o)(C1  +  m) 
(36) 
I  F =- {na s(N- N )  +  wa(L- nN)}. 
f  0  0 
As  can be  seen  from  (34)  the  subsidy has  no  effect on final 
equilibrium employment.  In the  Technical  Appendix  the solutions for N(t), 
A(t)  and  F(t)  (equations  (I9)  - (2I))  show  that,  in fact,  employment  and 
foreign borrowing always  remain at their initial equilibrium levels.  The 
reason for  the  inefficacy of  the  subsidy  is quite simple  :  as  can be  seen 
from  (36)  firms  in initial equilibrium balance  the  marginal  product of 
labour with its marginal  cost,from which  the  savings  of  tax liabilities 
due  to  a  unit decrease  in unemployment  are deducted.  lfhen  they are offered 
a  subsidy  they realise that over  time  they have  to  pay  for it to  cover  the 
cost of borrowing  :  the present value of  a  unit subsidy exactly equals  the 
present value of  the  increase  in future  taxes.  The  inefficacy of  the  sub-
sidy is  therefore due  to  the  combination of a  severe  finance  constraint 
with  the  fact  that each firm knows  that all other  firms  behave  identically. 
This  assumption corresponds  therefore more  closely to  a  monopolised  than 
to a  comp_eti ti  ve  market.  The  next case  considers  a  competitive market. 
Case  2 
Here  we  maximise  as  in case  I  but replace constraint  (26)  by 
(26').  From  similar calculations  the equilibrium conditions  are given 
by  : -22-
(38)  pQK  =  (r  +  o)  (C1  +  m) 
The  implication of  (39)  is  that while  foreign debt  is nf  the 
representative  firm  only perceives  the  foreign debt  due  to its own  contri-
bution.  Condition  (37)  collapses  to  the  result obtained  in case 
if n  = 1  the  subsidy has  no  effect on  equilibrium employment.  By  con-
trast if n  were  very  large then  the  equilibrium result is identical  to 
the  one  obtained in Section 3.  The  reason why  the  subsidy affects equili-
brium  employment  and  capital stock for  N >  1  is  the  following.  When  the 
firm hires  an additional worker it receives  in equilibrium an  expected 
subsidy a  s.  Tax  liabilities increase by  a  s  - wa  but  the  firm only has 
1  0  0 
to  pay -(as- wa).  n  o 
In  the  Technical  Appendix  a  dynamic  analysis  similar  to  the  one 
in Section 3  is carried out.  For  y  <  the  analysis  is intractable  so 
we  focus  on  the  special casey= 1.  For  y  =  1  the  eigenvalues  of  the diffe-
rential  equation system  (N,  A,  F,  A3)  are  : 
(40)  -f' P2 
r  +  b. 
2 
where  b.  is as  defined  in  (21).  Clearly,  for  f  >  0  the  equilibrium has 
14  the  desired  local saddle-point property  As  shown  by  equations  (19)  -
(21)  in the  Technical  Appendix  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  Nand A is deter-
mined  only  by  p2,  while  the  adjustment of F  and  A3  depends  on both  p1 and 
p2.  Hence  the  dynamic  paths  for  N and  A have  the  same  qualitative proper-
ties with respect  to  changes  in crs  as  those  analysed  in Section 3. 
14  h  '  f  .  .  .  .  .  T  e  case  =  0  g1ves  r1se  to  a  d1fferent  analys1s  s1nce  N would  then be 
directly determined  from  constraint  (26)  and  independently of  the  firm's 
optimising behaviour. -23-
Case  3 
If the  incidence  of  the  cost of  foreign debt  falls  on wage  income 
and  w remains  constant  then neither constraint  (26)  nor  tax liabilities 
exist anymore  for  the  firm.  The  case  is  then identical  to  the  one  analysed 
in Section 3  with  the  only difference that  the upper  limit on  the  subsidy 
payments  exists  no  longer. 
4.2  Optimal  Employment  Subsidies 
So  far  the  subsidy rate  s  has  been  treated as  arbitrarily fixed 
by  government  and  we  have  analysed  the effects of variations  in that rate. 
We  now  consider  the  question whether  there is,  in fact,  an optimal  rate 
s  by  which  we  mean  the  following.  If the  government  offered to  firms 
the  choice  of s,  under  the various  constraints  layed out previously,  does 
there exist a  value of  s  that maximise_s firms'  profits  ?  Technically,  s  be-
comes  an additional control variable in the  firm's  optimisation problem. 
In the analysis  of  case  1  we  have  seen that  the  subsidy has  no 
effect on  the  system,  therefore  the  question whether  there exists  an opti-
mal  value  s  is meaningless. 
As  we  have  already noted  before when  n  is large case  2  and  the 
case  considered  in Section 3  have  the  common  feature  that in final equili-
brium  employment  depends  positively on  the value  of  s.  This  means  that 
government  in its pursuit of full  employment  will  always  set its  optimal 
s  as  high as  permitted by  the  constraints,  as  long  as  s  does  not  exceed 
the value  required for  full  employment. 
If the  firm  is to  choose  its preferred s,  will it similarly 
choose  s  as  high  as  possible  so  that we  can be  confident that as  much 
employment  as  possible will  be  created  in full harmony  between  individual 
maximising  behaviour  and  the  societal goal  of achieving full  employment  ? 
The  analysis  is relegated to  the  Technical  Appendix.  There  we 
show  that in equilibrium firms  wish  to set  s  as  high  as  possible  (as  the 
government  would  have  wished  to sets), so  that  the  maximal  effect on equi-
librium employment  is assured.  While  we  have  not undertaken an analysis -24-
of  the  time path of optimal  subsidy  the  set-up of  the maximisation problem 
suggests  the conjecture that s  will move  as  rapidly as  possible to its 
15  upper  bound  • 
15A bang-bang solution cannot  occur  due  to  the  presence of adjustment 
costs  and  risk aversion. -25-
5.  MARGINAL  EMPLOYMENT  SUBSIDIES  IN  THE  CLOSED  ECONOMY 
We  now  analyse  MES  in an economy  which  does  not  exchange  goods 
with  the rest of  the world.  By  definition,  this is  the  case  for  the  non-
traded sector of  an  economy.  Furthermore,no  international capital transac-
tions  can  take place and  we  assume  that  the nominal  rate of interest is 
maintained  equal  to  the rate of  time preference r.  However,  in the present 
model  prices  become  endogenous  and  therefore also  the  real rates of interest 
r  - p/p. 
The  framework  we  now  use  can be  described  as  follows.  For any 
time  paths  of  prices  and  subsidies,  maximisation of real profits by  firms 
yields  a  supply  schedule  for  goods  or,  equivalently,  a  demand  schedule  for 
investment.  Similarly,  for  any  time  paths of prices  and  subsidies utility 
maximisation by  workers  yields  a  demand  schedule  for  goods  or equivalently, 
a  supply schedule for  savings..  Equilibrium in the goods market  requires 
aggregate  investment  to  equal  aggregate  savings.  This  equilibrium condi-
tion can be  solved at any  time  t  for  the  equilibrium price  p  as  a  function 
of s. 
The  analysis  is relegated to  the  Technical  Appendix.  Before 
discussing  the results  some  additional  features  of  the model  will be des-
cribed.  The  real wage  remains  fixed  in this model  but,  to close  the  sys-
tem,  it is assumed  that  subsidies  are  paid with  taxes  imposed  on workers. 
Expected  income  for  any  worker  can  then be  derived as  follows.  We  first 
assume  that the probability of  being unemployed  is uniform for  each 
member  of  the  labour  force  and  for  each  t  :  w = N/L  is  the probability 
of being  employed  and  (I  - w)  is  the probability of being unemployed.  If 
a  worker  is unemployed  he  receives  a  real unemployment  compensation aw 
if he  is  employed  he  receives  a  real salary w.  Expected real  income  of  a 
member  of  the  labour  force  is  then 
(4I)  y  ww  +  (I  - w)aw  - s(N - N )/L +  nrV/pL 
0 
1  = L {wN  +  aw(L  - N)  - s(N  - N
0
)  +  nrV/p} 
where  unemployment  compensation and  subsidies are  assumed  adjusted for 
inflAtion.  Capital accumulation is financed with workers'  savings  and -26-
the monetary value of  a  firm's  capital stock is V.  Expected  income  iden-
tically equals  the  sum  of  expected  consumption  and  savings.  Aggregation 
over  the  labour  force  yields 
(42)  L(E  +  ~)  =  wN  +  aw(L  - N)  - s(N  - N ) 
p  0 
nrV 
+ ---
p 
where  W = nV/1,  and  E  and  W/p  are,  respectively,  real  consumption and 
real  savings.  Savings  can  only be  invested in firms  so  that  : 
(43)  nV  = ni = LW 
p  p 
Thus,  for  any  given price path firms  are constrained by  effective demand 
of  the  labour  force.  If for  any  p  investment  demand  exceeds  savings  the 
price has  to fall,  inducing an  increase  in the  real rate of  interest and 
therefore  a  decline in desired aggregate  investment  and  an  increase  in 
desired aggregate  savings.  For  example,  when  an  MES  is offered  to  firms 
they  tend  to  respond  by hiring more  labour  and  install more  capital  to 
offer a  higher output.  To  make  this  possible workers'  savings  have  to 
increase.  The  real rate of  interest therefore must  rise  implying  that 
prices must  fall. 
The  formal  model  is set up  in the  Technical  Appendix  and  yields 
exactly  the  same  equilibrium conditions  for  employment  and  the capital 
stock as  in equations  (15)  and  (16)  of  Section 3.  Hence,  the  effects 
of  a  MES  on equilibrium employment  and  capital stock in a  closed  economy 
are identical  to  those  in an  open economy.  The  adjustment  path is however 
likely to be different. -27-
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we  analyse  MES  as  a  policy  to  generate more 
employment.  Unemployment  in this paper is viewed  as  a  disequilibrium 
feature  caused by  rigid real wages  rather than as  an equilibrium phenome-
non  in the spirit of Lucas  (1981).  For definiteness,  the  economic  envi-
ronment  is  taken as  stationary and  we  determine  the effects of subsidies 
in that stationary environment  and  characterise the  dynamic  path  and  the 
new  equilibrium solution.  If,  in reality,  the  environment were  to  improve 
in the  future  the  subsidy  could of  course  be  partially or  totally dis-
continued. 
Economic  structure is often usefully characterised in terms  of 
traded  (or  open)  and  non-traded  (or closed)  sectors.  We  analyse both  cases 
in turn,  assuming  that the entire economy  is open or,  alternatively,  closed. 
The  results  we  think are close approximations  of  the  case where  one  or  the 
other sector receives  the  subsidy •ince casual  empirical observation 
suggests  that  the  actual  resource  flows  between sectors  is constrained 
by  institutional and  behavioural rigidities.  Since  the results  in both 
cases  are qualitatively identical  the overall effects of subsidies  provided 
to both sectors are approximated  by  their sum. 
We  find  that  the  effectiveness of an  ME.S  depends  on a  variety of 
factors.  First,  the effects depend  on  the  base  on which  the  subsidy opera-
tes.  Second,  a  transitory subsidy will only have  transitory effects on 
employment.  Third,  the effectivenss of  the  subsidy depends  on how  it is 
financed.  In the  extreme  case  where  the  corporate  sector is  taxed  to 
finance  subsidies  and  where  firms  are identical,  have  full knowledge  of 
the method  of  financing  subsidies,  and  take  into account  the  response of 
its replicas,  the  subsidy has  no  effect.  In less  extreme  cases  a  MES  is 
always  stimulating employment.  Fourth,  while  the  equilibrium effect of 
the  subsidy is  independent of risk attitudes,  adjustment paths  are  gene-
rally affected. 
Whenever  the  subsidy affects  employment  we  find  that an optimal 
subsidy exists  and  is equal  to  the  maximum  allowed  by  the  finance  cons-
traints.  Moreover,  the  same  rate is optimal  for all parties  (government, -28-
firms,  workers)  involved.  For  some  approximative  empirical  magnitudes  for 
EEC  countries  the  subsidy would  bring  these  economies  to  target  (full) 
employment within the  short  or  medium  run if for  that time horizon the 
elasticity of  labour  demand  exceeds  0,1. 
To  conclude  we  note  some  limitations of  the analysis.  Throughout 
the  paper  the heroic  assumption of  identical  firms  and  homogeneous  labour 
was  maintained.  If firms  were  diverse in their characteristics  the  results 
of  the analysis would  certainly be modified,but without  specifying  the 
difference in firm characteristics it is difficult to  say more.  One  impli-
cation of diversity can however  be  noted  from  the  analysis of  cases  1  and  2 
in Section 4.  If firms  are diverse  (but still competitive)  then case  2  is 
more  likely to be  applicable and  the  subsidy is more  effective. 
Finally,  one  would  of course wish  to  abandon  for  some  parts  of 
the  economy  the hypotheses  of  competitive behaviour,  introduce different 
skill categories  for workers  and  model  union behaviour.  For  example, 
it is not  a  surprise that an MES  has  the  same  employment  effects  in a 
closed as  in an  open  economy  as  long  as  in both cases  competitive behaviour 
prevails.  One  feature  that may  distinguish both sectors  in the  real world 
is  a  lower degree  of  competition in the  closed  economy  (or sector)  and  in 
this context  one  would  expect differential effects of  an  MES.  However, 
introduction of  such  features  would  complicate  the  analysis  considerably 
and  our hopes  of  arriving at a  firm theoretical characterisation are not 
strong enough  to  engage  in this  adventure.  We  still believe  that our  ana-
lysis captures  the most  essential aspects of  the  questions  raised in this 
paper  and  that the results are meaningful  approximations. -29-
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Technical  Appendix 
A-1.  Dynamic  Analysis  for  Section 2 
With  the capital stock K held  constant  the optimal  path for  the 
optimisation problem posed  in Section 2  is governed  by  the  two  differen-
tial equations 
(1) 
(2) 
where 
and 
. 
N = 
. 
A 
A - qN 
a  {I  +  (1  - y) 
0 
TIN=  pQN- (w- os). 
}  , 
The  differential  system  (I)  - (2)  has  been obtained  from  equa-
tions  (6),  (9)  and  (11)  of  the main  text. 
The  Jacobian matrix of  the differential system  (1)  - (2)  is 
found  to  be 
(3)  J  = l:  qJ  (r + 
where 
- {pQ  +  (1  - y)(r +  2  2  8  =  q)qa A /n}/¢  NN  0 
The  eigenvalues  of  the matrix are readily calculated and  are 
r  +  b.. 
(4) 
2 -32-
where 
and  all quantities are evaluated at equilibrium. 
It is readily found  that 
(5.a) 
(5.b)  I  I 
2  2 
1  2 ( q ( r  +  q) a  +  p  QNN  ) q  a
0 
( 1  - y)  N 
{  o  }  aN  < 0  =  - ~<P  <Pn  +  pQNNN  as  ' 
and  we  have  imposed  QNNN  >  o  as  would  be  the  case with  a  Cobb-Douglas 
production function  for  example. 
The  eigenvectors  of  J  corresponding  to  p1,  p2  are respectively 
{6) 
so  that  the  general  solution of  the differential system  {1)  - {2),  in the 
neighbourhood  of  the  equilibrium  (N,  A),  may  be written 
(7) 
To  pick out  the  stable arm  of  the  local saddle-point we  choose 
the  as  yet unspecified initial value A
0  so  as  to  eqpate  B1  to  zero  (thus 
eliminating  the  growing positive exponential  term e  1t);  the known  ini-
tial value  N
0  then determines  B2.  As  a  result of  these calculations 
we  find  that  the  time  paths of  N and  A are given by 
{8)  N(t)  N +  (N  -
- p2t 
N)e 
0 
A(t)  A  +  (N  - N)(q  + 
p2t 
=  p2)e 
0 
{9) -33-
_  p
2
t 
Eliminating  (N  - N)e  between  (8)  and  (9),  we  find  that 
0 
along  the  optimal  path N and  A are related via 
(lOa)  N  (N  - A  A 
q  +  P2)  +  q  +  P2 
from  which it immediately  follows  that  the  slope  of  the  optimal  path 
in the  (N,  A)  phase plane  is 
(lOb) 
dN  _ 
dA  - _q_+_p_
2 
<  0  . 
The  sign of  (lOb)  follows  observing that 
so  that 
q  +  P2  <  o. 
A-2.  Impact  Effects  when  Fiscal Deficits are Financed  on External 
Capital Markets 
For  analytical tractability we  consider  the  model  of  Section 3 
with K held  constant.  So  we  are considering  the  optimisation problem 
(11) 
s.t. 
!
00 
max 
A  o 
. 
-rt  y 
e  Tf  dt 
( 12)  N  =  A  - qN 
(13)  F  = ~crs(N- N )  +  wa~(~- N)  - fF  o  n 
where  n  for  case  1  and  ~  1  for  case  2. -34-
The  first-order  conditions  are 
(14)  A. I  yn  y-1 
CA 
(I 5)  A. I  - (r +  q)A.I  {yn  y-I 
nN  +  A. 2~(a- wa)} 
(I 6)  A.  - (r +  f)A.  =  y-I  (r + f)/n  .  2  2  yn 
Using  (I4)  to  turn  (15)  into  a  differential  equa~ion for  A we 
have  together with  (I2),  (13)  and  (16)  a  system of  four  non-linear diffe-
rential equations in  A,  F  and  A.
2
•  A  local  linear analysis  of  this  system 
is only tractable for  the  special casey= I.  In this  case we  find  that 
the Jacobian matrix of  the differential  system governing  the  motion  of 
N,  A,  F  and  A.2  is 
-q  0  0 
-pQNN/ao  (r +  q)  0 
- ~(as - wa) 
(I 7)  J=  a 
0 
~(as - wa)  0  - f  0 
0  0  0  (r +  f) 
This matrix has  eigenvalues  (r +f), - f,  p1,  Pz  and  so  the differential 
system for  N,  A,  F  and  A.2  exhibits  local  saddle point behaviour  provided 
f  > 0.  The  eigenvectors  associated with  the stable negative roots -f 
and  Pz  are respectively 
0 
(18) 
0  q  +  Pz 
and 
~(as - wa)  I  (f +  p2) 
0  0 
With  the  same  procedure  as  used  to arrive at  the  solutions  (8) 
and  (9)  for  the  model  of Section  2  we  find  that 
(I 9)  N(t) 
_  p
2
t 
N +  (N  - N)e 
0 -35-
(20)  A(t)  A +  (N  - N){q  + 
p2t 
p2)e 
0 
{N_  - N)  ~(as - wa) 
}e-ft  (21)  F(t)  F  +  { (F  - F)  - -
0  = 
0  f  +  p2 
(N  - N)  ~(as - wa)  p2t 
+ 
0 
(f  +  p2) 
e 
In the  case  ~ =  n  we  know  from  the main text that the  subsidy 
s  has  no  effect on  N,  hence  N remains  at the initial level  N  and  we  see 
0 
that in this  case  N{t)  =  N ,  A(t)  =  qN  and  F(t)  =F. 
0  0 
- For  the  second  case~= 1,  we  know  from  the  main  text that N 
- is affected by  s,  in particular that N >  N  ~  We  see by  comparing  {8), 
(9)  with  (19),  (20)  that the qualitative effect of  a  change  in s  on  the 
dynamic  parths  of  N and  A are the  same  as  in Section 2,  at least for  the 
special casey= 1. 
A-3.  Optimal  Subsidy  Scheme 
Referring to  the  optimisation problem  (11),  (12),  (13)  in A-2, 
s  now  also becomes  a  control variable.  Imposing  on the  subsidy  s  the 
.  1.  .  I  1nequa 1ty constra1nt 
(22)  aw  - s  >  0 
and  appending  this constraint  to  the  Hamiltonian with  the multiplier 
-rt 
~e  the necessary conditions  become 
(23)  A-1  =  Y7T 
y-1 
CA 
(24)  ~A2 = a(N  ~ 
y-1 
N  )  - Y7T 
0 
(25)  -rt 
~(aw - s)  o,  -rt  > o,  ¥  t  '  e  e  1.1  -
Without  a  constraint on  s  the optimisation leads  to contradictions 
for  reasons  which  will be  exvlained below.  For  convenience  we 
reintroduce  the  constraint already used  in Section  2. -36-
together with  the differential equations 
(26} 
(27)  •  y-1 
A 2  - (r +  f)A2 = YTI  (r + f)/n  . 
We  find  that  the  equilibrium values  of A,  N and  s  are given by 
(28)  A = qN 
(29) 
and 
ll(O"s  - aw) 
(r+q)CA  +  w(1-a)  - y-1 
YTI  cr  (N  - N  ) 
0  0 
(30)  (1  - ~)  =  ----:-.:11:....__ __  _ 
n  YTiy-1cr  (N  - N  ) 
0  0 
We  are considering the  case~= 1.  It is clear from  (30)  that we  must 
have  11  >  0  in order  to  avoid  the  contradiction  1 - 1/n =  0.  It then 
follows  from  (25)  that the  inequality constraint is saturated so  that 
(31)  s  = aw 
in equilibrium. 
Combining  (29),(30)  and  (31)  we  find  that  the equilibrium level 
of  employment  is given by 
(32)  pQN  =  (r +  q)CA  +  w(1  - 1/n)  - (1  - 1/n)cr
0aw  • 
Notice  that if we  had  not  imposed  any  contraint on  s  (so  that 
11  =  0  from  the outset)  then  (30)  would  have  become  the contradiction 
1 - 1/n =  0.  It is this contradiction which  imposes  on  us  mathematically 
the  economically sensible constraint  (22). -37-
Finally in the  case  ~  =  n  when,  as  we  know  from  the  main  text, 
the  subsidy  scheme  cannot affect employment,  we  see  that  (30)  can only 
be  satisfied if  ~ = 0.  The  equilibrium level of  s  is then  indeterminate, 
a  further reflection of  the  fact  that no  optimal  subsidy  scheme  exists 
in this  case. 
A-4.  Employment  subsidies  in the  Closed  Economy 
Real  profits of  the  representative firm which  are  assumed  to 
be  consumed  are  given by 
(33)  rV 
TI  = Q(K,N)  - C(A,I)  - wN  - aw(L  - N)  +  crs(N  - N
0
)  - p-
The  stock of capital is owned  by  workers  and  its nominal  value at time  t 
equals 
t 
(34)  V(t)  = f  p(v)  I(v)dv 
-oo 
where,  for  simplicity,  the  rate of capital depreciation o is set equal 
to  zero.  Real  interest payments  by  the  firm equal  rV/p  and  are received 
by  workers. 
For a  given  time path p  and  s  the  representative  firm seeks 
investment  I  and  hiring A so  as  to maximise 
(35) 
subject  to 
oo  -rt  y  f  e  TI  dt 
0 
. 
(36)  N = A  - qN 
(37)  K  I 
. 
(38)  v = pi  • 
Using  A 1,  A 2,  A 3  to denote respectively the  shadow  prices of 
labor,  real capital,  and  the nominal value of capital the necessary -38-
conditions for  the firm's  problem may  be written 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
Y -1 
AI  =  Y7T  CA 
Y -1  A2  +  A p  = y1r  C  3  I 
;..1  - (r +  q)A1  =  y-1  Y7T  (QN  - w(l-a)  +  os) 
Y -1  Y7T  Q  K 
y-1  Y7T  r/p  • 
The  consumer's  problem for  a  given path of  p  and  s  amounts  to 
choosing real  consumption E  so  as  to maximise 
(44)  /
00  e-rtu{E)dt 
0 
where  u  is a  concave utility function.  Since  the work-leisure ratio is 
considered institutionally fixed  the disutility of  work  or  the utility 
from  unemployment  are constants  and  therefore absent  from  the  function u. 
From  (41)  - (43)  of  the main  text  and  defining nominal  wealth 
per worker  as  W = nV/L,the  income  constraint on workers  can be written 
wN  +  aw(L  - N)  - s(N  - N ) 
(45)  W =  p  {  L 
0 
}  +  rW  - pE 
. 
where  W represents  nominal  savings. 
Letting n denote  the  consumer's  shadow  price for wealth  W,  the 
necessary conditions  are 
<  4 6)  np  =  u ' <E) 
(47)  n - rn  =  - rn. 
Noting  from  (47)  that n =  0  these  two  equations  combine  to yield  the 
differential equation determining  the  time  path for real  consumption E, which  is 
(48)  E.  =  Eu"(E)  E 
l>  u' (E)  E 
-39-
where  -Eu"(E)/u'(E)  measures  the  relative risk aversion of  consumers. 
The  representative firms'  necessary conditions  (39)  - (43) 
imply  a  demand  for  investment  schedule denendent  on p  and  s,  which  can be 
aggregated  over  n  firms.  The  workers-consumers'  necessary condition 
(48)  together with  the  income  constraint  (45)  imply  a  supply of savings 
schedule also dependent  on p  and  s,  which  can be  aggregated  over  L wor-
kers-consumers  .  By  equating the aggregate  demand  for  investment  to  the 
aggregate  supply of savings  at every point of  time  we  would  obtain the 
differential equation determining  the  time path for  p.  We  do  not expli-
citly write  down  this differential equation since  the dynamics  of  the 
model  is rather  complex.  The  equilibrium solution is however  easily 
obtained  and  is given by 
(49)  QN  =  (r +  q)CA  +  w(I  - a.)  - 0'  s 
0 
(50)  QK  r(l  +  ~) 
(51)  LE  wN  +  a.w(L  - N)  - cr  s(N- N )  +  rnV/p  . 
0  0 
We  observe  that  (49)  and  (50)  are  independent of prices  and 
identical  to  ( 15)  and  (16)  of  Section  2  so  that  the  equilibrium effects 
of  the  employment  subsidy on  employment  and  the capital stock are  the 
same.  Condition  (46)  together with  (51)  determine  the  equilibrium level 
of  consumption by  workers  and  the price level. 